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a b s t r a c t
We provide evidence of a cubic law of art prices that hints to a general pattern for the
distribution of artistic talent. The persistence across heterogeneousmarkets fromhistorical
ones to contemporary art auctions of a power law in thedistribution of the averageprice per
artist suggests the possibility of a universal law for talent distribution. We explore scale-
free networks of teacher–students to investigate the diffusion of talent over time.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Power-lawdistributions characterizemany natural and social phenomena, including indirectmeasures of scientific talent 1
(citations), managerial talent (compensations) and earning ability (Pareto law on income distribution) [1,2]. Based on art 2
historical research, we show evidence of a power-law tail in the distribution of artistic talent, which persists over centuries. 3
We measure the talent of artists with the average price of their artworks, obtained for the primary market of Renaissance 4
Italy up to the 1500s and for the secondary markets of Amsterdam during the 1600s and Paris and London between the 5
1700s and the 1800s, as well as for the global contemporary art market from worldwide auctions of the period 1985–2016. 6
We uncover an approximately cubic law. Beside its relevance for understanding the distribution and diffusion of human 7
talent, such a finding introduces a scientific approach to questions addressed qualitatively in art history, with rare recent 8
exceptions [3,4]. 9
A measure of talent of professional artists as perceived at the time of its expression is given by the price of artworks 10
when these are traded in a primary market with competition between buyers: this is definitely the case for the tail of the 11
distribution since high talent is scarce and allows the artist-monopolists to extract the expected surplus created by their 12
works. Similarly, in a competitive secondary market, prices of unique objects should reflect the (maximum) willingness to 13
pay on the demand side [4]. Therefore, we interpret the average price of the works of artists as a monetary measure of 14
their talent (or success recognized in a given historical context). We have collected data on the price of paintings from art 15
historical sources (including the Getty Research Institute database) for different phases of Western art [3,5–8]. Competitive 16
conditions on the demand side are found in each of these markets according to basic economic tests, for instance for the 17
‘‘law of one price’’ of sales across different destinations [5–8]. Finally, we have collected complete data on the top prices of 18
artworks traded in contemporary auctions worldwide (from the Artnews’s database), characterized by competitive bidding 19
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Fig. 1. Power-laws in art. Distribution of average prices (deflated for consumer price inflation) per artist (with multiple observations). The red line is the
estimated Pareto tail for prices above pm (vertical gray line) with scale parameter α (p-value for goodness-of-fit test from [1]: it supports the power law
when significantly different from zero). (a) Prices in gold florins of 1285 for the primary market in Italy (56 artists): α = 2.07 ± 0.18 with pm = 53 ± 30
(p-value 0.53). (b) Prices in guilders of 1597 for estimates in Amsterdam inventories (277 Dutch and Flemish artists): α = 3.77± 0.81 with pm = 65± 17
(p-value 0.21). (c) Prices in livres of 1745 for Paris auctions (494 French painters): α = 2.67±0.25 with pm = 87±18 (p-value 0.75). (d) Prices in pounds of
1780 for Christie’s auctions in London (556 British painters): α = 2.50± 0.25 with pm = 0.9± 0.2 (p-value 0.55). (e) Prices in thousand dollars of 2010 for
global auctions (575 artists from any period of painting and sculpture and any provenance in the world): α = 3.31± 0.22 with pm = 3612± 680 (p-value
0.41). The datasets and the consumer price inflation used for (a)–(d) are described and analyzed further in [5–8]. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
andmaximum information spreading. On this basis we have studied the distribution of the average price per artist, corrected1
for consumer price inflation.2
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Fig. 2. Master–student network of Dutch and Flemish artists (1500–1700). (a) Network of masters and students. Our elaboration on data from Ecartico.
The size of nodes increases with the number of degrees (students). Identified Dutch painters are in blue and Flemish painters in yellow. (b) Scale-free
distribution of the number of students per master: scale parameter γ = 3.06 ± 0.3 with lower bound km = 4 ± 1 (p-value for goodness-of-fit test 0.65,
supporting the power-law). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 1 presents the results in log–log diagrams, showing a power-law tail in all cases, with a density 1
Pr(p) ∼ p−α 2
for the price p, and a scaling parameter α around three. We follow standard methods [1] in estimating this parameter and 3
the lower bound of the scale-free distribution, and test successfully for the latter in all cases. Notice that this pattern is 4
consistent with variability of prices with quantifiable characteristics of the commissions (such as size, number of figures 5
depicted, support of the painting or the same age of the painter) emerging from hedonic regressions controlling for artists’ 6
fixed effects [4,5]: even if the distribution of individual talent (average price per painter) follows a power-law, the value of 7
individual paintings can change across different commissions and along the career of a painter. 8
Artistic talent is the ability to innovate in the production of valuable handmade objects. All innovations are more likely to 9
emerge in an appropriate environment [9], and artistic innovations flourished in Renaissance Italy thanks to a combination of 10
facilitating factors: economic prosperity leading to accumulation of non-productive capital, well-ruled city-states, a dynamic 11
upper-class looking for social recognition through its purchases, and a well functioning primary market that could reward 12
and price artistic quality. We have collected the first dataset of prices of paintings (in gold florins) sold by Italian masters to 13
public and private commissioners between 1285 and 1550 (for 315 documented transactions from art historical sources) [5]. 14
Fig. 1(a) shows the distribution of the average price per painter, whose tail follows a power law with exponent α ≈ 2.1. 15
The birth of extraordinary talents such as Leonardo, Michelangelo and Raphael in a short period of time, which appears 16
inconsistent with a normal distribution of talent around a characteristic scale, is entirely consistent with such a scale-free 17
distribution: once the demand for paintings increased and attracted new artists in the profession, unprecedented talents 18
emerged rather frequently, and spread their innovations (such as perspective, oil colors or their personal style) through 19
their followers. 20
We find a power-law tail also in Fig. 1(b), where we plot the same distribution based on Dutch and Flemish paintings 21
found in Amsterdam’s inventories during the 1600s (this dataset includes 2300 observations) [3,6]. Here the scale parameter 22
is α ≈ 3.8, reflecting higher concentration on artists with lower average prices, as we should expect for what was the first 23
mass market in art history [3]. This pattern can also help to explain the evolution of artistic talent by looking at the relation 24
between masters and apprentices: the network of teachers–students forms a tree which we have reconstructed for Dutch 25
and Flemish painters active over two centuries, with 1906 nodes and a giant component including 60% of the links (Fig. 2(a)). 26
We found that this is a scale-free network (Fig. 2(b)) where the probability of each master having k students follows: 27
Pr(k) ∼ k−γ 28
with γ ≈ 3:masters such as Rembrandt or Rubenswere not only better paid, but they had alsomore students, than ordinary 29
painters. Applying theories of dynamic networks [10,11] andmentorship [12]we can replicate such a scale-free network and 30
the positive correlation between average price of teachers and number of students (0.61) just by assuming that the choice of 31
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a teacher was based for each new painter on (a weighted average of) preferential attachment [10] and relative ‘‘fitness’’ [11]1
proxied by the average price of the active painters. This can explain howmore talented painters attracted and trained more2
followers spreading their art within artistic schools and genres: the correlation between average prices of teachers and their3
students is indeed positive (0.15).4
Since the 1700s and 1800s art auctions flourished in larger centers as Paris and London, where new elements of amodern5
efficient art market emerged: first a network of art dealers in Paris [7] and then art investment as an additional form of6
financial diversification in London [8]. These markets provides us with wider dataset for our tests. In Fig. 1(c)–(d) we obtain7
power-laws with scale parameters α ≈ 2.7 and α ≈ 2.5 respectively for French and British painters (each dataset includes8
about ten thousand observations on painters active in the domestic market).9
Our last test for a power-law of art pricing is on contemporary data from a globalized market. In Fig. 1(e) we use data on10
the top 10,000 prices of any artwork traded in any contemporary auction worldwide in the last thirty years. Also in this case11
the power-law in the tail is extremely evident, and statistically supported,with a scale parameterα ≈ 3.3. Superstars include12
those from earlier schools as well as contemporary artists, for instance impressionists and post-impressionists (Cezanne and13
van Gogh) or abstract expressionists (Pollock and Rothko). In conclusion, the persistence over many centuries and across14
heterogeneous markets of what appears as an approximately cubic law of art pricing hints to a general pattern for the15
distribution of artistic talent.16
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